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Aldous Huxley's Brave New World presents us with the terrifying 
possibilities of what human beings can do to one another when respect for 
the basic values of life are compromised. Many of the technologies 
envisioned by Huxley, such as in vitro fertilization and the genetic 
engineering of children, have proved to be remarkably prescient. What is 
especially compelling about Huxley 's Brave New World is the utilitarian 
promise of advancing science while ostensibly not harming anyone in the 
process. The principal promise consists in the abolishment of all disease 
and social conflict, albeit at the price of a moral enervation of the human 
psyche and the elimination of introspective religiou~ sentiments. This 
rather heavy price would be too much to bear except for the fact that those 
in control do not realize what has been lost. "Unlike the man reduced by 
disease or slavery, the people dehumanized a la Brave New World are not 
miserable, don't know that they are dehumanized , and, what is worse, 
would not care if they knew. They are, indeed, happy slaves with a slavish 
happiness." 1 
The National Academy of Sciences unveiled a set of research 
guidelines that would ease us into the brave new world of human 
embryonic stem cell (hESC) biotechnology. The authors of the document 
allege that we need to establish responsible oversight practices that will 
enhance the integrity of privately funded research with hESCs. 
Specifically, these hESC oversight committees would promote research 
that allows the destruction of human embryos for the express purpose of 
extracting stem cells, the purpose being to develop new regenerative 
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technologies such as replacement organs. Apart from the doubts some 
authors have expressed about the practical feasibility of creating cloned 
organs for transplantation, the means or methods that would be employed 
are repugnant to many. In a press release announcing these 
recommendations on April 26, 2005 we read that hESC oversight 
committees "should review proposals for research that takes stem cells 
from excess blastocysts at in vitro fertilization clinics or from blastocysts 
created expressly for stem cell research. They also should review any 
proposed use of blastocysts created by nuclear transfer, often referred to as 
therapeutic cloning."2 Here it should be said that employing somatic 
nuclear cell transfer (SNCT) techniques to create new organs is not really 
therapeutic cloning, but is the creation of a new organism from which an 
organ is harvested (i.e., reproductive cloning).3 
The report adds that guidelines should be developed to address "how 
far scientists should go in mixing human and animal cells to create so-
called chimeras, which researchers may need to do in order to test the 
therapeutic potential of human stem cells in animal models. "4 Specific 
safeguards would be in place, we are assured, so as to avoid the remote 
possibility of two mating chimeric animals giving birth to an offspring 
containing a human organ. Besides the philosophical question of whether a 
monkey with a human brain is still a monkey, a human being in a monkey 
suit, or a tertium quid of some kind, it is hard to avoid concluding that what 
it means to be human is unclear to the signatories of the Guidelines. This 
should not be too surprising I suppose, since many scientists are apparently 
convinced that there is no such thing as human nature. To be more precise, 
there are no fixed human characteristics that are naturally linked with being 
human, whkh means the special dignity we have traditionally ascribed to 
ourselves is merely the accidental by-product of evolptionary history. 
Indeed, the Prepublication Copy of the Guidelines states that there are no 
fixed species, and the boundaries separating traditional taxonomic 
groupings are "to some extent arbitrary."5 
While some scientists worry about an irrational blockade of further 
funding for hESC research based on religious convictions, Francis 
Fukuyama reminds us that neither Aldous Huxley nor C. S. Lewis believed 
religion was the only grounds for understanding what it means to be 
human. "Both writers suggest that nature itself, and in particular human 
nature, has a special role in defining for us what is right and wrong, just 
and unjust, important and unimportant."6 In this article I suggest that a 
consequentialist version of utilitarian ethical thinking is at work in the 
current debate over hES cell research. While this form of reasoning can 
explain why a right action is good, it cannot serve as a reliable guide for 
making correct ethical decisions, because the proposed good state of affairs 
allows the use of any means to attain the desired end. 
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I. Specific Features of the National Academies' Recommendations 
In what follows I implicitly defend the moral principle that it is never 
right to deliberately take the life of an innocent human being. Pope John 
Paul II stressed this very point in Evangelium Vitae , reminding us that the 
commandment "You shall not kill" (Ex. 20: 13; Deut. 5: 17) admits of no 
exception in the case of innocent human beings. "The deliberate decision 
to deprive an innocent human being of his life is always morally evil and 
can never be licit either as an end in itself or as a means to a good end."7 
Concerning the specific issue at hand here, since we do not know at what 
stage of development the human embryo is (or has become) a person, there 
is no justification for killing what could in fact be a personal human being. 
Chapter Three of the Guidelines for Human Embryonic Stem Cell 
Research addresses the primary ethical concerns surrounding the 
promotion of this biomedical investigative activity, namely, that the 
derivation of hESCs involves the destruction of the blastocyst which "is 
regarded by some people as a human being."8 This line of reasoning (or 
exposition) is somewhat fallacious, as no scientist proposes to derive 
hESCs from anything other than a human being. Bioethicists who deny 
that the blastocyst is a human being often appeal to the possibility of 
monozygotic twinning prior to implantation, but this claim implies that the 
zygote is just an unorganized clump of cells. The very fact we are speaking 
about twinning at all presupposes a pre-existing unitary organism, a single 
living entity that could possibly split into two genetically identical 
individuals. 
In the next section of the Guidelines, entitled "The Special Status of 
the Human Embryo," the authors offer an exaggeratedly subtle 
comparison: "some view human embryos as morally e(Juivalent to born 
human persons." At this juncture three possible positions are mentioned in 
defense of embryonic personhood: (1) the identity of a future person is 
present in the embryo, (2) the moral equivalence of the embryo to a person 
is associated with potentiality, and (3) human dignity is undermined by 
excessive manipulation of the embryo regardless of purpose. Each one of 
these positions is extremely complex, yet there is no discussion of the 
myriad philosophical issues associated with them. We are simply told that 
current cultural practice should dictate what is right or wrong about 
handling the human embryo. This is equivalent to basing moral judgments 
on majority rule, a democratic approach to thinking that is completely 
absurd in moral matters, since we can only regulate human affairs within 
the confines of the true and the good. 
Concerning the notion of cultural practice, the document states that 
since "the natural loss of an embryo in normal human reproduction is not 
recognized as a death that requires a funeral," the embryo must not be a 
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human being that is morally equivalent to a newborn person. True, funeral 
and burial rites are generally reserved for baptized individuals, for the 
unbaptized individual is not a full-fledged member of the Church with 
access to her sacraments and liturgy. Nevertheless, funeral services in the 
Catholic tradition include special prayers for children who die before 
baptism, and these prayers can be used for a stillborn child as well. Several 
American bishops have approved of holding funeral services for unborn 
children killed by abortion.9 
The Guidelines go on to state that since "the disposal of human 
embryos after completion of infertility treatments is not treated as murder 
by the legal system," the community does not view these entities as 
morally equivalent to human persons. While neither state nor federal law 
currently penalizes the disposal of surplus human embryos produced by in 
vitro fertilization, this does not necessarily mean that these entities do not 
deserve to be treated with the same respect as infants. As a matter of fact, 
one could argue that we are dealing with a legal lacuna here, one that will 
be addressed within a relatively short period of time. Interestingly enough, 
to date, there have been several successfully prosecuted criminal cases for 
the murder of a pregnant woman and the young human being in her womb. 
Besides the high profile Scott Peterson case in California, in which Lacy 
Peterson's husband was convicted on two counts of homicide - the murder 
of his wife and the killing of their son Connor, thirty states now include 
fetal homicide in their penal codes. Also, President Bush signed The 
Unborn Victims of Violence Act on April 1, 2004, a measure that has 
withstood constitutional challenges in several states. 
The Guidelines also remind us that Islam, Judaism and even some 
Protestant denominations do not recognize the human embryo as morally 
equivalent to a person until at least 40 days after concl\\ption. And since 
many of these same religions have a strong commitment to the idea that 
faith must be manifest in good works, the authors conclude that members 
of these congregations should support the use of hESCs, even if they believe 
the embryo "may have greater moral status than other collections of cells." 
This statement is both inaccurate and inconclusive. It is inaccurate because 
the human conceptus is an integrated, unified organism with a self-
contained program of development, and it is inconclusive because a moral 
judgment cannot be made based on such a conjectural premise. 
While the Guidelines rightly affirm that there is a general debate in 
society over the meaning of human dignity, the drafters of this document 
claim to have reached a balanced solution to this conundrum. Specifically, 
they state that "a profound moral obligation" is incumbent upon us to 
promote human dignity, working to restore health and natural function to 
the sick. While no one would argue with that altruistic aim, at least 
considered in the abstract, why are we willing to violate the human dignity 
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of one member of Homo sapiens in order to promote the physical welfare 
of others? One possibility is to simply deny that humans are unique vis-a-
vis other animals. 
[T]he popular notion that there are clear and distinct lines between 
species is a notoriously unreliable categorical scheme. Taxonomies 
developed since Aristotle do not necessarily countenance the idea of 
natural kinds, and modern scientists differ in their precise definitions 
of interspecies boundaries. There is general agreement in the 
scientific cornrnunity that these boundaries are to some extent 
arbitrary. 10 
Given the regnant views of human dignity on offer at present, Leon Kass 
suggests that the notion of personal dignity is of limited value in bioethics. II 
While I would not concede nearly so much, it is quite ironic that one of the 
classical distinguishing features of different mammalian species is that 
members of distinct natural kinds do not and cannot mate. The specific 
difference between humans and other animals is significant, and this 
biological boundary reinforces the philosophical notion of natural kinds. 
II. Utilitarian Reasoning and Consequentialist Motivation 
Of the many ethical theories currently available to us for the decision-
making process, ethicists generally agree that utilitarian reasoning is 
particularly well-suited for problem solving in biomedicine. Utilitarianism 
holds that the right course of action to follow in any given situation is the 
one that produces the greatest balance of benefits over harms for everyone 
concerned, and this consideration implies that the mejns employed to 
maximize results are more or less irrelevant. One merely postulates the 
desirability of some particular human good or state of affairs and then 
identifies the act or acts that will maximize (or optimize) the desired result. 
Elizabeth Anscombe introduced the term "consequentialism" to the 
discussion of utilitarianism in order to focus attention on the inherent 
strategy of maximizing the expected consequences of free choices. 12 
The attractiveness of what I will call utilitarian consequentialism 
rests with its straightforward, procedural approach to the decision-making 
process, with the rightness or wrongness of an action being judged 
exclusively by the anticipated consequences, providing apparently singular 
and unambiguous public policy determinations. Critics of utilitarian 
consequentialism call our attention to several limitations of its calculus of 
beneficial results . For instance, it does not take into account important 
intention-foresight and acts-omissions distinctions, and these are 
absolutely critical for evaluating the moral probity of human action. 
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Predictably, rights, obligations, and intentions are not easily included in the 
premises of utilitarian arguments. Since a consequentialist calculation of 
potential utilitarian benefit only provides an account of what makes a right 
act right, it is not a very suitable method for moral decision-making. 13 
Simply discussing the pros and cons of potential research protocols 
is not a cogent form of reasoning either. Given the fact that utilitarian 
consequentialism tends to limit moral judgment to a proportionalist 
assessment of the benefits and risks of anticipated outcomes, its 
practitioners often experience difficulty in providing satisfactory solutions 
to challenging moral questions. With respect to the pros and cons of human 
cloning, for instance, Dan Brock states: "there is not an ethically decisive 
case either for or against pennitting it or doing it."'4 This inconclusive 
response is not as benign as it might sound, for, as Hilary Putnam warns, to 
"think of all moral problems in tenns of 'trade-offs' is precisely not to 
think morally at all."'5 At the end of the day, as Charles Taylor writes, 
"disagreement seems utterly inarbitrable by reason, bridgeable only by 
propaganda, arm twisting, or emotional manipulation."'6 Indeed, the 
utilitarian consequentialist tends to pit the good of a specific individual 
against the good of society at large, creating an uneasy tension between the 
long-range interests of a community and individual rights. We are left with 
mere 'traffic rules' for detennining moral values, based almost exclusively 
on the perceived usefulness of a particular result, with little or no concern 
for moral truth or individual rights. "When dealing with a calculus of 
consequences, the inviolability of human dignity no longer exists, because 
nothing is good or bad in itself any more."17 
Numerous scientists and moral philosophers argue that the zygote, 
embryo or fetus is not really a person. After all, these life forms are not 
conscious, intelligent, free agents of choice. Those scienti6ts usually have a 
materialistic, evolutionary and mechanistic view of life, which leads them 
to deny that immature human life is worthy of legal protection. So Ronald 
Dworkin advocates the genetic engineering of human beings for the greater 
good, arguing that we have the responsibility to ensure that each individual 
life is useful. And "if playing God means struggling to improve what God 
deliberately or nature blindly has evolved over eons, then the first principle 
of ethical individualism commands that struggle, and its second principle 
forbids, in the absence of positive evidence of danger, hobbling scientists 
and doctors who volunteer to lead it."'8 While Dworkin is not considered to 
be a utilitarian, his principal argument, i.e., that the human embryo does 
not have a right to life because it is a non-sentient entity with no interests, 
is a utilitarian test for determining what can be considered a moral object. 
When you consider the fact that many non-sentient entities have legal 
interests and a public persona, such as corporations, associations, or 
estates, this argument is not very convincing. 19 
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Ever since David Hume insisted that we cannot derive moral norms 
from factual premises (i.e., deriving 'ought' from 'is'), the naturalistic 
fallacy has become common currency in modem thought. Nevertheless, 
Hume agreed with Plato and Aristotle that the ' is-ought' dichotomy is 
bridged by the goals we set for ourselves, and that the aims of human life 
cannot be reduced to simple sensual ends like pleasure.2o While there is a 
certain stylistic elegance associated with the reductionist strategy 
underlying utilitarian ethical paradigms, this way of reasoning does not 
incorporate the complexity of what it means to be human into the decision-
making process, nor does it consider the moral purpose for which we act. 
This is why Joseph Ratzinger stresses that there are many dangers 
associated with failing to limit oneself in the application of technological 
discoveries. "For it is very evident that everything depends on man 's not 
doing everything of which he is capable-for he is capable of destroying 
himself and the world-but on knowing that what 'should' be done and 
what 'may ' be done are the standard against which to measure what 'can' 
be done."21 
The consequentialist method of determining utilitarian benefit is 
severely hampered by the neutral position it assumes with respect to 
theories of the good as well as its disregard for motivation. As Jonathan 
Dancy writes: "consequentialism is a theory which gives us certain ends, 
but which is officially silent on which patterns of motivation may best 
promote those ends ."22 The advocates of hESC research would no doubt 
reply that we ought to pursue this activity in order to provide medical 
benefits to human beings with severely crippling maladies. This 
explanation of the merit of hESC research is not especially compelling 
because the ethical method employed presupposes the desired results. That 
is to say, utilitarian consequentialism inevitably entails ci£cular reasoning, 
accepting the notion that the end justifies the means. Arthur Caplan admits 
as much when he says that the task of a bioethicist is to determine what 
someone wants to achieve and then providing the values and principles 
needed to achieve it.23 This is in keeping with the utilitarian 
consequentialist's focus on hypothetical benefits, which are used to justify 
the use of any means to bring about the desired state of affairs. As Timothy 
O'Connell asserts, the end-not-means principle "must be rejected if by 
'end' one means the consequences of one's act, for it is these consequences 
precisely that justify the means."24 What is missing here is an objective 
moral norm, principle, or standard by which to judge which options are 
truly good to employ as means to the desired end. Any possible actions can 
be measured against one another in an ethical sense only if they have some 
shared property that can be evaluated by a distinct moral norm.25 
The tragic death of 18-year-old Jesse Gelsinger sheds some light on 
the pitfalls of utilitarian consequentialist decision-making, especially with 
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respect to the motivation of those who take part in biomedical research. 
The researchers in this case failed to inform the patient that an 
experimental adenovirus gene therapy designed to correct a serious liver 
ailment had caused several deaths in experiments with monkeys. An 
important feature of the case was the motivation of the head investigator, 
Dr. James M. Wilson, who admitted that factors other than the patient's 
medical welfare influenced his decision to pursue this high-risk research 
protocol. "Publishing in first-rate journals. That's what turns us on. You ' ve 
got to be on the cutting edge and take risks if you ' re going to stay on top."26 
Besides the blinding effects of unbridled self-interest, utilitarian 
reasoning fails to take into account considerations of justice. In the case of 
hESC research, what warrants the taking of the life of an immature human 
being, in order to pursue a hypothetical gain for mature human beings? The 
only plausible answer is that the adult human being is judged to be more 
valuable to society than the immature one is, an argument that sounds a lot 
like John Rawls ' moral theory of justice. Comparing normative moral 
theory to the scientific method, in which new data calls for constant 
modifications of theory, Rawls contends that justice is not a universal, 
constant, objective truth but represents an ever-changing theory that strives 
for reflective moral equilibriumY This purely subjective concept offers us 
no way to bridge the epistemological divide separating diverse theories of 
justice. One set of considered moral judgments is simply pitted against 
another, with little prospect of reaching a satisfactory resolution to 
conflicting theOlies of justice.28 
Paradoxically, besides insisting that community justice is not defined 
in terms of desired consequences, Rawl's theory could be employed to call 
into question hESC research. Rawls proposes imagining oneself in an 
original position of veiled ignorance, with your task as moral trustee being 
to promote the self-interested good of your principal. Applying this idea to 
the issue at hand, if a person were to imagine that she was once an embryo, 
and that others might have had the power to interrupt her nascent life, she 
would probably veto any action that is not respectful of the individuality of 
others and work to provide legal sanctions to prevent the killing of all 
embryonic life. 
An intriguing development in this story is the fact that a motion filed 
by a pro-life advocacy group in California, the Life Legal Defense 
Foundation, could give rise to considerable delay in the issuance of state 
bonds to fund the $3 billion hESC research initiative in that state. This 
legal challenge does not address the so-called "clone-and-kill" procedures 
contemplated by the California Institute for Regenerative Medicine, but 
focuses on the legality of disbursing state funds without any oversight by 
elected officials. Moreover, in · answer to a query concerning the impact 
hESC research might have on job creation in the Bay Area, Nobel laureate 
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1. Michael Bishop, the Chancellor of the University of California-San 
Francisco, replied: "We haven ' t figured out how to make stem cells do 
what we need them to do to be useful clinically. Until that is done, it's a 
pretty shaky base for startups."29 
Conclusion 
I have outlined some of the more salient ethical problems associated 
with the utilitarian mindset that underlies the current thinking on the 
advisability of hESC research. We are on the verge of entering into a brave 
new world of wholesale destruction of human embryos, a public policy that 
would expand the possibilities of dehumanizing ourselves to a degree that 
is hard to imagine. Perhaps we should not be too surprised by this 
development. In keeping with the regnant notion that the human race is not 
a fixed species but just a more advanced form of primate, the very concept 
of human nature has been called into question as well as the special dignity 
of humans. Ultimately, recourse to utilitarian consequentialist reasoning to 
formulate public policy on hESC research is invalid, because this 
methodology only provides an account of what makes a right action right 
and not what is good or bad in itself. Like it or not, a human being is a 
human being, independent of its active capacity for rational, volitional and 
relational activity. Instructively, Theodor Haecker once remarked that 
Satan attempts to rob beauty of its transparency, moving us to be more 
fascinated by the captivating interest of an idea than the splendor of 
objective truth.30 Let us hope the truth about the human embryo will soon 
prevail in the public forum in general and in the biomedical research arena 
in particular. 
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